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REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION-EFFECT OF THE
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY-Questions concerning easements by
implication usually arise when land which initially was under com-
mon ownership is severed and the owner of one part seeks a right
to make some specific use of the other. If the conveyor asserts
such a right, the easement constitutes an implied reservation; if
the conveyee makes the claim, the easement is said to arise by im-
plied grant.
Traditionally the theory supporting the creation of an ease-
ment by implication is found in the idea that a conveyance of
property includes whatever would be necessary for the beneficial
enjoyment of that property.' Courts have employed two quite
similar tests to aid them in determining whether an easement
can be implied. Many courts have accepted this test:
"Where, during the unity of title, an apparently permanent
and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in
favor of another part, which at the time of the severance is in
use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the
other, then, upon a severance of such ownership . . . there
arises by implication of law a grant or reservation of the right
to continue such use.'2
Other courts have stated the test somewhat differently: "... a
use must be continuous, apparent, permanent and necessary to
be the basis of an implied easement upon the severance of the
ownership of an estate."' Under either test, the existence of each
essential factor must be shown before the easement will be
found to have arisen on the basis of terms implied in the grant.
4
The elements of apparency, continuity, and permanency are
I See Trattar v. Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286 at 291, 95 N.E. (2d) 685 (1950). See generally
3 PowEtLL, REAL PROPERTY 415-416 (1952); Simonton, "Ways By Necessity," 25 COL. L. Rxv.
571 (1925).
2 See Greasy Slough Outing Club v. Amick, 224 Ark. 330 at 337, 274 S.W. (2d) 63
(1954), quoting with approval from John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 103
Ind. 582, 2 N.E. 188 (1885). The exact language used may vary slightly among these
courts but it is believed that this is typical. See Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637,
46 A. (2d) 898 (1946); Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N.E. 523, 78 S.E. (2d) 323 (1953); Keller v.
Fitzpatrick, 204 Okla. 192, 228 P. (2d) 367 (1951).
3 See Trattar v. Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286 at 292, 95 N.E. (2d) 685 (1950); Roberts
v. Monroe, 261 Ala. 569, 75 S. (2d) 492 (1954); Hutcheson v. Sumrall, 220 Miss. 834, 72
S. (2d) 225 (1954).
4 See 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §780 (1939).
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usually required as being considered essential to give notice of
the asserted right to the person against whom the right is asserted.
Necessity is regarded as being essential to permit a judicial de-
termination that in fact there must be some defect in the ex-
pressed agreement of the parties which justifies judicial modifica-
tion of that agreement. Several courts distinguish between reason-
able necessity, which must be shown to assert an implied grant,
and strict necessity, which is essential to the determination that
an implied reservation has arisen." The basis for the distinction is
founded in the doctrine which looks with disfavor upon a deroga-
tion from the grant of the conveyor.
The traditional view that all the essential elements of the
tests applied to determine the existence of an easement by impli-
cation have independent, determinative significance is in dis-
tinct contrast to the position of the American Law Institute. The
Restatement of Property, section 476, explains the existence of an
easement by implication on the basis of an inference drawn from
the circumstances of the grant which has severed land initially
under common ownership. The judicial function in respect to
the easement by implication, according to the Restatement, is to
effectuate the intention of the parties (or their probable intention
if they had thought about the matter) which has not been ex-
pressed in the existing agreement. In no instance is there any
necessity for demonstrating the existence of any particular factors
in order to determine that the easement was intended by the
parties.6 In all events, the factors having a bearing upon intention
5 Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 54 A. (2d) 137 (1946); Bennett v. Evans, 161 Neb.
807, 74 N.W. (2d) 728 (1956); Schachter v. Fider, 5 N.J. Super. 426, 69 A. (2d) 329 (1949);
A.J. & J.O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 488, 119 A. (2d) 472 (1955), affd. 22
N.J. 75, 123 A. (2d) 536 (1956); Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W. (2d) 163
(1952); and Chevalier v. Tyler, 118 Vt. 448, 111 A. (2d) 722 (1955). Easements by implied
reservation are not recognized by the Georgia court. Srochi v. Postell, 206 Ga. 59, 55 S.E.
(2d) 603 (1949). The Wisconsin court does not recognize either implied grants or implied
reservations. Scheeler v. Dewerd, 256 Wis. 428, 41 N.W. (2d) 635 (1950).
6 "In determining whether the circumstances under which a conveyance of land
is made imply an easement, the following factors are important
(a) whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee,
(b) the terms of the conveyance,
(c) the consideration given for it,
(d) whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee,
(e) the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,
(f) whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee,
(g) the manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance, and
(h) the extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been known to
the parties." PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §476 (1944).
7251959 ] COMMENTS
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
must be examined in order to reach a proper determination of
the existence of an easement. But the intention of the parties
is the sole fact of decisive significance. The listed factors are those
which frequently recur and may help to indicate intention, but
none has decisive significance.
Apparency, continuity, permanency, and necessity may be
used to indicate the intention of the parties, which is actually
controlling. But to the extent that any of these factors has an in-
dependent and decisive significance, the purport of the Restate-
ment has been rejected by application of the traditional standards.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the cases involving
easements by implication which have appeared since the Restate-
ment was adopted in 1944 to determine the extent to which
courts have followed or been influenced by the Restatement or
have independently adopted a similar standard.
I. Courts Which Have Not Considered the Restatement
Despite the 'logical consistency of the Restatement analysis of
the easement by implication, several courts have continued to
assertthe traditional rationale of the two previously described
tests as the basis for the right claimed, and have ignored the
Restatement entirely. It is frequently impossible, however, to
determine the exact way in which the essential factors of the
traditional tests are applied. In some instances, it appears that
they are merely labels attached by the court to determine the
existence of an easement by implication after the central issues
have actually been resolved on the basis of the intention of the
parties. Or the essential factors may be regarded as independent,
determinative elements apart from intention, which must be
shown before the easement will be found to have arisen.
When a party seeks an implied easement of way, for example,
it is commonly found that the way has been continuous, perma-
nent, and apparent. Attention of the court is then focused on
necessity. Only those facts bearing on necessity will be detailed,
rendering impossible a determination of the potential influence of
other factors on the decision. Frequently the decision will depend
upon the existence and adequacy of alternative means of ingress
7 Common examples of a way are alleys, walks, and roads.
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and egress." But the Illinois court has determined that an ease-
ment existed over an alley between two apartment buildings when
it was shown that there was a general plan to make the alley
available for the joint use of the occupants of both properties.'
Similarly, another court noted that a common driveway was used
by occupants of each lot for an extended period, and failed to
discuss the question of necessity."0 These cases indicate that other
adequate means of ingress and egress do not prevent a finding
of necessity and the implication of an easement." Indeed, they
may indicate that necessity even in the traditional application
constitutes a label describing various considerations. But because
of the insufficiency of the facts reported it cannot be determined
whether these courts would imply an easement on the basis of
intention alone without the showing of necessity as an independ-
ent, determinative element. To the extent that the requirement
of necessity is relaxed because of other factors, a court moves to-
ward the Restatement position.
In two cases courts have stressed the requirement of strict
necessity for implied reservations, stemming from the principle
which frowns upon derogation from a grant by the conveyor. The
Maryland court recently decided that a garage wall encroaching
upon the plaintiff's lot by six inches was protected by an im-
plied reservation. 2 Strict necessity existed because removal of
the wall would destroy the garage. The dissenting judge argued
that there was no strict necessity since the encroachment could
be eliminated by razing the garage. In a Vermont case the sewage
from a hotel erected by a common owner emptied into two cess-
pools and then on to a twenty-five acre plot of land, also under
common ownership. 13 This sewer arrangement existed for thirty
years before severance of the plot and conveyance to the plain-
tiff. The court concluded that the overflow had been intended
to be permanent. Although it was not the only sewer system
8 Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N.C. 523, 78 S.E. (2d) 323 (1953); Goldstein v. Wachovia Bank
and Trust Co., 241 N.C. 583, 86 S.E. (2d) 84 (1955). The Restatement recognizes that
necessity alone may be sufficient to imply an easement. See comment g, §476.
9 Gilbert v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 7 Il. (2d) 496, 131 N.E. (2d) 1 (1955).
10Jacobson v. Luzon Lumber Co., 192 Misc. 183, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 147 (1948).
11 But see Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 64 S. (2d) 411 (1952), where an easement
will be denied if there are any other practical means of ingress and egress.
12 Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 54 A. (2d) 137 (1946).
13 Chevalier v. Tyler, 118 Vt. 448, 111 A. (2d) 722 (1955).
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which could service the hotel, it was the only one reasonably
available and the court found strict necessity. In both these cases
the circumstances seem sufficient to imply an easement under
the Restatement approach. Despite the insistence upon strict
necessity as an independent determinative element, it is doubtful
that the definition of strict necessity applied by these courts con-
stitutes more than a determination of the intention of the parties
and the affixation of the proper label. Since strict necessity was said
to exist, however, it is uncertain how free these courts would
feel to make a determination of the existence of an easement by
implication on the basis of intention of the parties as the sole
element of determinative significance.
The Connecticut and New Jersey courts have determined that
the existence of an easement by implication depends upon the
intention of the parties, but without reference to the principles
enunciated by the Restatement. In both instances the result of
the determination was to deny the existence of an easement even
though the factors deemed of determinative, independent impor-
tance under the traditional tests were found to be present. Both
courts regarded the questions whether the right claimed is reason-
ably necessary and has been long continued in an obvious manner,
indicating permanency, as merely an aid to the court in finding the
intention of the parties, which was to be controlling. The Con-
necticut case regarded proof of the traditional elements as creat-
ing a presumption that an easement had been conveyed which was
successfully rebutted by parol evidence showing that only a license
had been granted.1 4 The New Jersey case indicated that the
traditional elements, which had previously had independent
significance, were merely adjectives to aid the court.'5 The plain-
tiff had sought an easement by implied grant permitting trucks
unloading at his warehouse to turn around conveniently. The
court relied upon the following circumstances in rejecting this
claim: the trucks came upon the defendant's land merely as a
matter of convenience; the defendant had at the time of the
grant given the plaintiff an express easement allowing trucks to
enter by a road across the defendant's land; the plaintiff did not
14 Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637, 46 A. (2d) 898 (1946).
15 A.J. & J.O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 488, 119 A. (2d) 472, affd. 22
N.J. 75, 123 A. (2d) 536 (1955).
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seek a conspicuous driveway of determinable limits but a vagrant
privilege to be exercised in an area without boundaries. Both
decisions indicate merely that the implication to be drawn from
the presence of the determinative elements under the traditional
tests may be displaced by other evidence. But it is impossible to
state that circumstances sufficient to create an easement under
the Restatement approach would be sufficient to permit the im-
plication in these jurisdictions in the absence of at least one of
the essential elements of the traditional tests.' 6
The Michigan court has taken an approach clearly contrary
to the Restatement by giving decisive significance to a single
element, continuity, in the sense of use without the interference
of man.' 7 In a recent case an easement over a mutual driveway was
sought.' 8 The driveway had been used for many years by the
common owner to enter a garage on the lot now owned by the
plaintiff and was the only way to enter the garage without knock-
ing a hole in its back wall. But the court refused to imply an
easement since use of the driveway required a human act, and
therefore was not continuous.
It is difficult to determine the impact of the Restatement upon
courts which have continued verbally to apply the traditional
standards. In some instances the circumstances of the case are such
that identical results could have been reached under the traditional
tests or the Restatement view. In others it cannot be known
whether the traditional factors are flexible labels applied after the
court in fact has weighed all the circumstances or whether they
have independent, determinative significance. It is only when a
court refuses to imply an easement, though under the Restatement
standards the circumstances suggest its implication, that a definite
determination of the test applied by the court can be made.
16 In Schachter v. Fider, 5 N.J. Super. 426, 69 A. (2d) 329 (1949), the court indicated
that when an implied reservation is sought, strict necessity must be shown.
17 This test will differentiate between a way which is non-continuous, and a sewer
which is continuous. The reason given for this distinction is that a way ". . . has no
existence during the continuance of unity of seizin, and upon severance of the tenements
does not pass unless it is a way of necessity or the operative words of the conveyance
are sufficient to grant it de novo." Levy v. Dossin's Food Products, (W.D. Mich. 1947) -
72 F. Supp. 855 at 861, quoting from Burling v. Leiter, 272 Mich. 448 at 455-456,
262 N.W. 388 (1935).
18 Milewski v. Wolski, 314 Mich. 445, 22 N.W. (2d) 831 (1946). See also Waubun
Beach Assn. v. Wilson, 274 Mich. 598, 265 N.W. 474 (1936); Levy v. Dossin's Food
Products, (W.D. Mich. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 855.
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II. Courts Which Have Considered the Restatement
A. Courts Which Seem To Reject the Restatement
One court has expressly rejected the approach of the Restate-
ment in favor of a requirement of strict necessity as an independ-
ent, determinative element for an implied reservation. 9 0, the
owner of two adjoining lots, leased lot 1 for use as a gas station.
A wash shed, attached to the gas station, encroached upon lot
2. 0 sold lot 2 to her daughter for $10 and love and affection.
The Texas court rejected O's claims for an implied reservation
because the evidence did not show-that the gas station could not
be conducted without the wash shed. The circumstances favoring
the implication of a reservation were (1) the grant to the daughter
was gratuitous, indicating that the grantor did not intend to de-
prive herself of existing uses benefiting the lot retained; (2) the
use had been exercised for a considerable period of time; and
(3) the shed was beneficial although not strictly essential to the
station. In its opinion, the court stated:
"The Institute formula, [Restatement] in its approach to
the fundamental matter of intent of the parties, is perhaps
more scientific than a doctrine, which includes the 'strict
necessity' requirement. But the latter, too, has its good points.
It is undoubtedly simpler of application .... -20
The Nebraska court, while not expressly rejecting the Re-
statement, may have done so inferentially. In a recent case,2' the
adjoining lots of P and D were prior to severance under the
ownership of 0, who had built a house and garage on each lot.
One wall of D's garage encroached on P's lot two feet and its
eaves extended an additional six inches, but this was unknown at
the time of severance. D claimed an implied reservation, but his
claim was denied because the evidence failed to show that the
use was open, visible, and apparent as an inspection of the
premises without a survey would not show the encroachment, or
that the easement was strictly necessary. 2 The court discussed
the question whether a rule of reasonable or strict necessity should
19 Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W. (2d) 163 (1952).
20 Id. at 66.
21 Bennett v. Evans, 161 Neb. 807, 74 N.W. (2d) 728 (1956).
22 Compare Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 54 A. (2d) 137 (1946), where an encroach-
ment was apparent even though not detectable without a survey.
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apply to a reservation. To support its conclusion in favor of strict
necessity it cited Restatement, section 476, comments a and c."
The Restatement acknowledges that whether a grant or reserva-
tion is involved is one of the factors to be considered and suggests
that the implication of a grant will be made more readily than
that of a reservation, but rejects the conclusion of the Nebraska
court that strict necessity is an indispensable element. The facts
stated in the report are insufficient to determine whether a dif-
ferent result would be reached under the Restatement approach,
but the case at least indicates that the court did not understand
the Restatement position that no one factor is of determinative
influence in ascertaining the intention of the parties.
One Missouri appellate court also denied an easement where
an encroachment on the plaintiff's property could be altered. 4
Adjoining lots of D and P were, prior to severance, owned by 0
who erected a building on D's lot, one wall of which was flush
with P's lot line. P sought to enjoin D from maintaining down-
spouts which overhung P's lot and emptied into a sewer running
over P's land. D could, by a $2,000 alteration, cause the water to
run in the opposite direction. The court did not consider the
fact that 0 had erected the building so that the water would drain
in this manner, that the downspouts emptied into a sewer main-
tained by 0 solely for this purpose, and that 0 had conveyed this
lot to D's predecessor prior to conveying the other lot to P, mak-
ing the claim one for an implied grant. 5
In all three of these cases, the courts conceived that the de-
terminative factor was whether the existing encroachment might
feasibly be moved. If such was the case, the necessity required by
the traditional tests did not exist, and thus any other circumstances
indicating the intention of the parties which could have out-
weighed the lack of strict necessity were ignored. While the
Restatement does not suggest that a court should focus its atten-
23 "In construing conveyances doubts are resolved in favor of the conveyee and against
the conveyor." Comment c. This was used by the court to support its conclusion that
strict necessity should be required.
24 Schnider v. M.E.H. Realty Investment Co., 239 Mo. App. 546, 193 S.W. (2d) 69
(1946).
25In support of its decision, the court cited part of Comment c, note 23 supra.
Under the facts this was a misapplication. Comment c refers to the parties at the time
of severance of the original estates and all doubts should thus have been resolved in
favor of D who was seeking the easement. See Marshall v. Callahan, 241 Mo. App. 336,
229 S.W. (2d) 780 (1950), where this principle was properly applied.
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tion on necessity as an element of independent significance, the
only express repudiation of the Restatement approach is made
by the Texas court, on the basis of the greater simplicity in apply-
ing the objective standards of the traditional test. Though it is
true that a determination of intention which is unexpressed is a
difficult task, ease of determination should not be substituted for
propriety of result.
B. Courts Which Approve the Restatement Approach
It should be recalled that the factors given independent signifi-
cance under the traditional tests are likewise regarded by the
Restatement as factors of importance to be considered in determin-
ing the intention of the parties. Where a court cites the Restate-
ment with approval, but determines intention solely on the basis of
the existence of the traditional factors, it cannot be definitely de-
termined which approach is being used as the basis for decision.
The Washington court has implied a reservation where a con-
crete driveway, in existence since the horse and buggy days, was
the only means of ingress and egress for vehicular traffic to the
defendant's apartments.2 6 The reported facts are insufficient to in-
dicate whether the court considered circumstances other than
necessity and long prior use of the driveway. Even so, however,
the result is consistent with the Restatement approach, which
recognizes that absent other circumstances these two factors may
justify a determination that the intention of the parties was to
reserve an easement to the conveyor. The result is likewise
consistent with the traditional view, giving these elements in-
dependent significance apart from their effect on the intention
of the parties.
The Minnesota court in one case listed the eight factors of
section 476, but based its decision regarding the existence of an
easement on a failure to prove sufficient necessity since this was
the only issue argued in the appellate court2 The Kansas court
in a much-cited case29 implied a reservation of an easement in a
sewer line. In doing so the court discussed the Restatement at
length and appeared expressly to accept the approach of determin-
26 Adams v. Cullen, 44 Wash. (2d) 502, 268 P. (2d) 451 (1954).
27 See comments c and j of §476.
28 Olson v. Mullen, 244 Minn. 31, 68 N.W. (2d) 640 (1955).
29 Van Sandt v. Royster, 148 Kan. 495, 85 P. (2d) 698 (1938).
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ing the existence of the reservation on the basis of the intention of
the parties. In a later case, however, this court justified an implied
reservation of an easement in a concrete driveway on wholly
traditional grounds.30 In both cases the same result might have
been reached under either the traditional tests or the Restate-
ment standards. The language of the decisions leaves doubt about
the position of the Kansas court in respect to the Restatement
principles.
C. Courts Which Seem To Adopt the Restatement Approach
The Restatement lists eight factors to aid a court in arriving
at the intention of the parties, but its basic approach involves a
consideration of all factors which may indicate that intention.
A number of courts have adopted this approach either by weighing
all relevant circumstances or by using the eight Restatement fac-
tors as a check list, without denying the significance of other
factors.
The Massachusetts court has refrained from attaching any
particular significance to the presence or absence of such tradi-
tional elements as apparency, continuity, permanency, and neces-
sity. In one case31 two woolen mills had been linked by a canal
for twenty-seven years. During common ownership the mill on lot
1 was supplied with water from the canal, which extended over
lot 2 to a water supply thereon. After severance by an auction,
the owner of lot 2 cut off this supply of water. Among the cir-
cumstances inducing the court to imply an easement supporting
the claim of the auction purchaser to the use of the water were
(1) the canal was apparent and obvious; (2) the canal's location
indicated that it was for the exclusive use of the mill on lot
1; and (3) the auction catalog and the auctioneer's representations
indicated that continued use was contemplated. In another case
P sought an easement over a roadway leading from a public street
across D's land to a barn on P's land. 2 The court found the road
had been used by people traveling to the barn since 1897, that
it was clearly visible, and that it was necessary for the use and
enjoyment of the barn. D pointed out that P's predecessor in title
had received this property by a gratuitous transfer from the com-
30 Smith v. Harris, 181 Kan. 237, 311 P. (2d) 325 (1957).
31 Jasper v. Worcester Spinning & Finishing Co., 318 Mass. 752, 64 N.E. (2d) 89 (1945).
32 Sorel v. Boisjolie, 330 Mass. 513, 115 N.E. (2d) 492 (1953).
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mon owner. In the course of its opinion the court quoted Re-
statement, section 476, comment c, to the effect that ". . while
the absence of consideration was an important circumstance, 'the
fact that a conveyance is gratuitous does not necessarily rebut the
implication of an easement in favor of the conveyee.' ,,a3
In four cases the Pennsylvania courts have had to determine
whether an easement of-way existed.3 4 Duration of use prior to
severance, necessity, and mutual benefit were important consider-
ations in each instance, with ultimate focus in each case on the in-
tention of the parties. An additional circumstance in one case was
the involuntary nature of the conveyance, which indicated that
the grantor intended to part with the least amount of property
possible and required stronger indications of an intention to make
the conveyance than if the transfer had been voluntary. 5
Where an irrigation ditch was used to transport water over
D's land for thirty years prior to severance, the Utah court decided
that P had an easement by implied grant. 6 Express use was made
of several of the Restatement factors, including the following:
a. The claimants were the conveyees and therefore all doubts
should be resolved in their favor [Restatement, §476(a)];
b. The purchase price indicated that the use and value of
the water was taken into consideration at the time of purchase
[Restatement, §476(c)];
c. The evidence clearly indicated that the use of the ditch
was necessary for the proper use of the land for the pur-
poses for which it was purchased, i.e., farming [Restatement,
§476(e)];
d. The land had been used prior to the conveyance for
growing irrigated crops [Restatement, §47 6(g)];
e. The manner of prior use was continuous, open, extensive,
and well known [Restatement, §476(h)].
In a Kentucky case, all the factors did not favor the implica-
tion of an easement. It was therefore necessary to balance the
83Id. at 518.
34 Baslego v. Kruleskie, 162 Pa. Super. 174, 56 A. (2d) 377 (1948); Hoover v. Frickanisce,
169 Pa. Super. 443, 82 A. (2d) 570 (1951); Spaeder v. Tabak, 170 Pa. Super. 392, 85 A.
(2d) 654 (1952); Schwoyer v. Smith, 388 Pa. 637, 131 A. (2d) 385 (1957).
35 Schwoyer v. Smith, note 34 supra. In another case the conveyance was voluntary
and D contended that P must show this way was necessary. The court stated, "Not only
are appellant's suggestions unreasonable, but necessity is only one factor to be con-
sidered with all other surrounding circumstances." Baslego v. Kruleskie, note 34 supra,
at 177-178.
36Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. (2d) 264 (1947).
37 Knight v. Shell, 313 Ky. 852, 233 S.W. (2d) 973 (1950).
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various factors in reaching a determination upon the basis of the
intention of the parties. 0 owned 100 acres of land bordered on
the east and south by two highways. A roadway extended from the
highway on the east across three-quarters of an acre of land which
0 had sold to D to give access to a barn on land 0 subsequently
conveyed to P. Since the road had been in use prior to severance
and both 0 and D had known of its existence, factors (d) and (e).
above, operated in favor of the implication. But the easement
was denied because the countervailing factors were deemed to
be of greater weight. 0 had been the grantor, so all doubts must
be resolved in favor of D, the grantee. Since this was not a simul-
taneous conveyance where the inference is strong that the grantor
intended the privileges of use to continue to exist among the
various grantees, the implication is weakened to such an extent
that other factors, particularly reasonable necessity, must be shown
with greater clarity. Finally, the road was not necessary, since P
had recently built another road to the barn at a cost of $116,
which was not disproportionate to an estate worth $16,000.
The Iowa court, in granting D an easement to use a railroad
spur across P's lot, was influenced by the facts that this spur had
a long existence prior to severance, that the price paid by P had
been $25 at a time when the fair value without an easement was
$150, and that no other railway existed to supply a plant on D's
lot with coalY8
Section 476 has been applied by the Oregon court in two
cases. In one the circumstances inducing the court to declare an
implied grant of an easement of way were the reciprocal value
of the road to each party, the well defined nature of the road and
and its apparency at the time of severance, and the absurdity of
the position that the owner who severed the common ownership
of the tract by a deed of gift to his son intended that a servitude
of great value to him should end.3 9 In the second case the court
38 Wilbur v. Council Bluffs, 247 Iowa 268, 73 N.V. (2d) 112 (1955).
Two years later, the court implied a reservation where 0 had built two houses, the
house on lot 2 being behind that on lot 1. A sidewalk led from the front door of the
house on lot 2 over lot 1 to the street. Since this was the only means of access to the
front of the lot 2 house, the circumstances were sufficient to imply an easement
under the Restatement approach. The court resorted instead to the test of prior decisions:
the use must have been so long continued and obvious that it was manifest that it was
intended to be permanent, and it must be essential to the enjoyment of the land. Bray
v. Hardy, 248 Iowa 794, 82 N.W. (2d) 671 (1957).
39 Rose v. Denn, 188 Ore. 1, 213 P. (2d) 810 (1950).
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refused to imply a reservation of a way where the grantor had
been paid full consideration when she conveyed the land by
warranty deed, and no reciprocal benefits resulted to the parties.40
The court stated:
"Therefore, the conspicuity, i.e., the extent to which the
manner of prior use was or might have been known to the
parties . . . apparent purpose and reasonable necessity by
reason of the use made and to be made of the premises must
appear clear and cogent to overcome the import of the above
factors."
41
Additional facts indicated that the necessity for the easement
arose only after the conveyance.
III. Summary and Conclusions
Section 476 of the Restatement of Property determines the
existence of an easement by implication through an investigation
of all factors bearing upon the intention of the parties. This
intention alone is of determinative importance. Although eight
factors are suggested as often recurring and of importance in
resolving the question of intention, no single factor is given any
independent significance. The presence or absence of any par-
ticular factor is not individually determinative. "[The suggested
factors] are variables rather than absolutes. None can be given a
fixed value. Each affects the decision as to the implication arising
from all in a different degree in different situations. 42 Where
suggested by the circumstances of the case, additional factors
may have importance in resolving the question of intention.
These may include the consideration paid in relation to the value
of the property with and without the easement, the presence or
absence of reciprocal benefits, and indications of intended con-
tinuance of the rights asserted by the physical characteristics of
the estate prior to severance. If contradictory inferences are
presented by the circumstances of the case, the court must proceed
to determine the relative weight of each through a balancing
process.
In apparent contrast, the traditional means of resolving the
40 Jack v. Hunt, 200 Ore. 263, 264 P. (2d) 461, reh. den. 265 P. (2d) 251 (1954).
41 Jack v. Hunt, 200 Ore. 263 at 270, 264 P. (2d) 461 (1954).
42 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §476, comment a (1944).
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problem of the existence of an easement by implication is by
investigation of the circumstances of the particular case to deter-
mine if the factors of apparency, continuity, permanence, and
necessity are present. Allegedly, each factor is of independent
and potentially determinative significance. Without the concur-
rence of all, the easement cannot be found to have arisen. How-
ever, it may be possible to demonstrate that the intention of the
parties was not to create an easement despite the concurrence of
the essential factors.
In all events, the easement by implication conflicts with other
generally accepted principles of property law. The implied reser-
vation is contradictory to the idea that the grantor will not be
permitted to derogate from his grant. This notion does find some
expression, however, in the requirement of a greater showing of
necessity for the creation of an implied reservation than is neces-
sary for an implied grant. Further, the implied grant contravenes
the principle that the owner of property cannot be deprived of his
exclusive rights of use and enjoyment except by his voluntary
act. Actually, the easement by implication must be recognized as
an acceptance by the law of the failure of individuals to express
their intentions adequately when conveying property. Judicial
relief is thus given to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
Difficulty is encountered only in the means applied to determine
intent.
The seeming conflict between the Restatement position and
the traditional view as to the means to resolve the existence of
an easement by implication may be more apparent than real. If
the traditional view uses the factors of supposedly determinative
importance as mere labels to be applied after a determination of
the intent of the parties there is only a semantic difference between
the two positions. If the factors are actually given independent,
determinative significance there is a real difference in approach.
Generally, it is impossible to determine from the decisions the
actual application of the factors of supposedly independent im-
portance. It is only where intention is established showing the
existence of an easement but one of the so-called "independent"
elements is lacking that an actual determination of the application
of the traditional tests by the courts is possible. And it is only here
that a determination of the proper approach is imperative. The
increasing acceptance of the Restatement approach that intention
alone is the determinative factor in resolving the existence of an
7371959 ] COMMENTS
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
easement arising by implication is consistent with the willingness
of modem courts to investigate the difficult problem of intention
where such an investigation is essential to a resolution of the rights
of the parties.
Albert A. Hailer, S.Ed.
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